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ABSTRACT. Self-governance of natural resources has started to gain increasing atten-
tion as an alternative to command-and-control and market-based tools. However,
a fundamental question remains: is self-governance economically beneficial, allowing it
to serve as an alternative management tool? This paper uses a unique set of survey data
from a territorial-user-right-based South Korean inshore (maul) fishery and applies an
empirical strategy to provide some of the first quantitative evidence that self-governance
benefits maul fishermen. We find that members of the self-governance group perceive the
management system as having had a positive impact on four out of the eight criteria we
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tested: stock recovery, curtailed fishing effort, reduced disputes among fishermen and
declining incidents of illegal fishing. Considering that these groups have been in exis-
tence on average for less than seven years, these results indicate that the management
scheme has made good progress overall.
1. Introduction
Territorial user rights in fisheries (TURFs) as a management tool of fishery
resources are attracting increasing attention as an alternative to command-
and-control and market-based tools (Christy,1982; Ostrom et al., 2002;
Wilson et al., 2003; Cunningham and Bostock, 2005; Townsend et al., 2008).
TURFs in general are defined as community-based or individual-based
rights of use (or tenure) and exclusion over the fishery resources within
a specific area and for a set period of time (Christy, 1982). In many
cases, TURFs are also combined with self-governance of fisheries; local
communities establish and impose a set of rules on themselves. TURFs
are established to create an appropriate environment for self-governance
through community ‘ownership’ of common property resources. The own-
ers of these property rights, having an interest in the resource’s current
and future productivity, are inclined to manage the fishing effort so that
they maximize the net benefits from the resource. Self-governance under
a TURF could be advantageous over command-and-control in parts of the
world where the cost of enforcement and monitoring is high, or where insti-
tutional capacity to implement a market-based tool such as an individual
transferable quota system is lacking (Cancino et al., 2007).
Self-governance has been practiced in many parts of the world for cen-
turies (Jentoft, 2003) and many such arrangements have involved TURFs
of one type or another. The Japanese have a long history of self-governance
of fisheries under TURFs that they call fishing rights (Uchida and Makino,
2008) and a similar system was introduced to the Chilean loco fishery in
the early 1990s (Cancino et al., 2007). The Pacific Basin is especially rich in
TURF systems, also known as customary marine tenure systems, that are
firmly integrated into the overall social, economic and cultural life of com-
munities in the region (Ruddle et al., 1992). New England lobster fishermen
in the United States have been exercising similarly exclusive territorial use
rights. South Korea’s maul fishery, the subject of this study, also functions
under a TURF system.
For self-governance of natural resources to be successful, however,
merely establishing a set of rules for users of the natural resource is not suf-
ficient. Based on the theory of clubs, a group of natural resource users must
be ‘privileged’ (Buchanan, 1965). That is, managing the natural resource
as a group must bring a higher present value of benefits to its members
than to non-members and, preferably, a value that exceeds the status quo
without self-governance. This higher present value of net benefits from a
given fishery, therefore, is an incentive constraint on forming and main-
taining a self-governance group. Fishermen should clearly perceive that
their actions have a direct and pronounced beneficial effect on the state
and productivity of their portion of the resource and hence on their future
profits.
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Despite the importance of this incentive constraint, the current literature
has not examined empirically the impact of forming a self-governance
group on profitability. In the past, many case studies have examined
self-governance and TURF systems in terms of their economic efficiency
and equity, but few have been quantitative and used data that were
collected systematically from both self-governing and non-self-governing
fishermen. One exception is Gaspart and Platteau (2007), who compared
self-governing and non-self-governing fishermen’s perceptions of the suc-
cess of self-regulation of fishing efforts for small-scale fisheries in Senegal.1
However, the study was limited to examining perceptions of an indirect
measure of success. Our study, in contrast, focuses on a direct measure
of success – profitability – for several reasons. First, anecdotal evidence
from Japanese cases of fishery self-governance has indicated that increased
profitability was most persuasive in convincing the most skeptical fisher-
men and thus contributed the most to sustaining self-governance (Uchida
and Baba, 2008). Second, profitability as the measure of success is most
consistent with the theory of clubs, which is the basis of our conceptual
framework. Finally, it seems most plausible to think that, in the context of
commercial fisheries, maximizing profit is the most important objective for
most, if not all, fishermen.
The principal contribution of this study is empirical evidence of the
impact of self-governance on fishermen’s profitability. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study to quantitatively test the economic impact
of a self-regulatory approach to fish resources using data that have been
systematically collected at the fishery group level and that cover groups
both with and without self-governance. To meet this goal, we capitalize on
a unique setting in South Korea that offers an appealing institutional set-
ting in which to study these questions. In 2001, South Korea instituted a
policy to encourage voluntary self-governance groups for fishery manage-
ment. By 2007, nearly 300 such groups had been formed in South Korea
for inshore (maul) fishery, or TURF, fisheries. These fisheries are comprised
of clams and other sedentary species in designated areas.2 Regulated by
the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries’ minister’s decree, licenses are
assigned to fishing village societies and local fishery cooperatives com-
prised of fishermen who live in the designated areas (Lee et al., 2006).
These groups are richly varied in terms of targeted species and gear types
and have introduced a variety of self-imposed rules. At the same time,
numerous other fishermen engage in the same or similar fisheries in those
regions and are not members of any self-governance group.
1 Their measure of success implicitly assumed that higher profits are realized if
self-regulations are effective so long as the inverse demand curve is downward
sloping.
2 South Korean fisheries other than the maul consist of (1) coastal fisheries that gen-
erally involve fishing vessels of less than 8 gross tons operating in areas where
fishermen can fish and return to the departure port within a day; (2) offshore fish-
eries that involve fishing vessels that exceed 8 gross tons and operate in areas
where fishermen can fish and return to the departure port within two or three
days; and (3) aquaculture (Lee et al., 2006).
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To understand the changes in perceptions of the economic impacts of
forming these self-governance groups, we utilize a unique set of data from
a survey that we designed and conducted with leaders of 157 groups,
77 of which manage fisheries as a TURF with self-governance and 80
communities (ochongye) that have TURFs and engage in the same or
similar fisheries but do not have a formally established or registered self-
governance group. In identifying the effect of self-governance on economic
outcomes, we control for self-selection by employing a covariate matching
method.
Overall, we find strong evidence that self-governance groups perceive
greater benefits in terms of both revenue and cost compared to non-
self-governance groups. One important caveat, however, is that the out-
comes are based on an ordinal measure of changes in revenues, costs and
prices instead of changes in their levels. We therefore do not measure the
monetary magnitude of the effect of self-governance. Nevertheless, our
systematic data collection and analysis approach gives some of the first
quantitative evidence of the effects of self-governance.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a con-
ceptual framework based on the theory of clubs. Section 3 describes back-
ground and current information on the status of self-governance groups in
maul fisheries in South Korea. Section 4 describes our data collection effort.
Section 5 provides descriptive statistics and other survey results for the
self-governance groups and individual fishermen in our sample. Section 6
examines the economic outcome of self-governance by first outlining our
identification strategy and then discussing the results from the matching
models. Section 7 concludes.
2. Conceptual framework: theory of clubs
Our conceptual framework is based on the theory of clubs (Buchanan,
1965). Club goods are a subset of impure public goods, a type of goods that
lies between private goods (with complete rivalry and costless exclusion)
and pure public goods (complete non-rivalry and infeasible exclusion).
A club is defined as a group of individuals deriving mutual benefits
from sharing impure public goods characterized by non-excludability and
some rivalry in the form of congestion. As such, a club is viewed as
a private, non-governmental alternative provider of such impure public
goods.
Fish resources can be categorized as impure public goods. Unlike pure
public goods, fish harvests are subject to rivalry – fish that were har-
vested by one fisherman cannot be harvested by another. If the fish
resources have open access, the resource remains non-excludable. With lim-
ited access, however, such as through licensing or establishment of TURFs,
fish resources can be made excludable to varying degrees. However, even
with limited access and some excludability, they can still be subject to
3 Pretesting of the survey revealed the possibility that we could risk a low response
rate if we asked for levels of revenues and costs.
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overexploitation. For example, if the number of incumbent fishermen is
too large, as is often the case, then non-excludability of the resource among
license holders or TURF members creates an incentive structure that is sim-
ilar to open access, i.e., a race to fish. This will lead to overexploitation of
the resource, overinvestment (capital stuffing) and rent dissipation.
One way to overcome overexploitation is to convert the fish resource to a
club good. If the resource is successfully converted, members of the result-
ing club would reap a stream of rents from the resource. Members would
have exclusive rights and the size of the club and the resource would be
optimal when the resource is used efficiently to sustain the rents over time.
However, based on the theory of clubs, three conditions must hold in order
to transform a fishery resource into a club good. First, the boundaries of the
fishing ground must be defined, preferably in accordance with the ecol-
ogy of the targeted fish, so that members have the exclusive right to the
fish. Second, membership in the club – a fishermen’s group – must be well
defined and controlled. Finally, and most importantly from the perspec-
tive of this study, the group must be ‘privileged’ – it must bring a higher
present value of benefits to its members than is received by non-members
(i.e., status quo). The first two conditions are related to excludability, while
the third is related to profitability or an incentive-compatibility constraint
of forming and maintaining a club. These conditions are also interrelated.
Whether a club is privileged or not depends on how well the benefits are
made exclusive to its members.
The excludability condition can be achieved in several ways. One exam-
ple is the license system – membership is defined by the possession of a
license. Another example is the formation of a fishermen’s group such as a
cooperative and, in the case of the US Northeast’s groundfish fishery, estab-
lishment of sectors. In both cases, monitoring for violators and enforcement
are essential, and the cost of that enforcement relates to the issue of afford-
ability. Theory suggests that exclusion methods need to be affordable for a
club to function.
More challenging to meet is the privileged condition. In the context of
fisheries, the theory of clubs defines several ways in which clubs can bring
higher profits to their members after controlling for other factors that affect
profit, such as targeted species and gear type used. Importantly, many
activities that could increase revenues and/or reduce costs often require
some critical mass to be effective or have a public-good nature so that no
individual alone would voluntarily pursue them. Reducing the harvest as a
way of rebuilding the fish stocks is certainly one such activity. It is effective
only if done by most, if not all, harvesters, and no single fisherman will do
it solo voluntarily. Other activities that could yield positive results but that
require cooperation among members to be effective are:
• Direct marketing and sales. Direct sales by the group would elimi-
nate middlemen, thereby allowing fishermen to increase their profit
margins. A steady and sufficient supply of various fish is essential
for this tactic to be successful so it requires small-scale fishermen to
coordinate as a group to do this efficiently.
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• Quality control. As another means of marketing and sales, quality
control requires a high level of cooperation among group members
since just a handful of incidents of mixing low-quality product into
high-quality product can destroy the fishers’ reputations. Quality
control can technically be done individually, but the prospect of mea-
surable success is slim without a sufficient and consistent supply of
high-quality products.
• Fishing ground maintenance. A well-kept fishing ground can enhance
revenue if it leads to improved stock levels. Alternatively, it could
lead to cost reductions by decreasing incidents of gear damage from
debris underwater. However, maintenance is more likely to be suc-
cessful if the effort is coordinated as a group and thereby avoids free-
riding.
• Monitoring illegal fishing. By reducing incidents of poaching and other
illegal fishing activities, a group can enhance its catch and thus its
revenue. Monitoring will be much more effective if done as a group,
especially if covering a wide area.
• Information sharing. If information about the location of good fish-
ing spots is shared among group members, this will contribute to
reduced costs (e.g., search costs). Group members can also share mar-
ket information, such as inventory levels of processors and buyers
and scheduled arrivals of large tourist groups to the region. Mem-
bers can use such information to decide when the best time to land
the fish would be.
It needs to be emphasized that greater economic returns are neces-
sary for incentive-compatibility, not excludability of fish. Although the
targeted species of the maul fisheries are predominantly sedentary ones
such as shellfish, non-members residing in the same region could free-
ride on members’ efforts to increase the stock, thereby jeopardizing the
self-governance scheme. However, it is not the fish per se that need to be
exclusive; rather, it is the benefit – specifically, economic returns – from the
fishery. This explains why many self-management groups engage in mar-
keting activities such as quality control and developing a private brand
(Uchida and Baba, 2008; Uchida and Watanobe, 2008; Uchida et al., 2010).
Moreover, excludability does not need to be spillover-proof. As long as
group members receive a greater net benefit than they did prior to forming
the group and greater than current non-members, it is incentive-compatible
for members to maintain the group. Studies have shown that benefits from
rationalized fishery management systems often come from output mar-
kets and are generated quickly, as opposed to often-cited cost reductions
through capital adjustments that take a longer time to realize (Homans and
Wilen, 2005). This relatively quick return and the privileged condition of
the theory imply that collective activities aiming to enhance fishery rev-
enues are an important component in sustaining self-governance groups,
which are essential to achieving mid- to long-term objectives such as
recovered fish stocks and capital adjustments.
This manuscript seeks to understand whether self-governance groups
in maul fisheries that exist today have achieved the privileged condition,
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i.e., higher profitability compared to non-self-governance groups. If they
have achieved the condition, then they have a chance of sustaining their
self-governance regimes (i.e., clubs).
3. Self-governance of inshore TURFs in South Korea
We examine the outcomes of self-governance groups in the context of
South Korea’s maul fishery that operates under the TURF system. South
Korea provides a unique opportunity to study the impact of the formation
of self-governance groups on economic outcomes. As elsewhere, despite
the government’s efforts to manage fisheries primarily through licensing
and permit systems, South Korea has still suffered from the problems of
‘race to fish’ and stock depletion (Cheong, 2004). The profitability of its
fisheries has declined due to the vicious cycle of over-competition, stock
depletion and capital stuffing (Lee et al., 2006). Despite costly monitoring
and enforcement efforts, illegal fishing has persisted and aggravated stock
depletions. Fishing grounds have also suffered from conflicts among fisher-
men, who have tended to rely on government subsidies and other favorable
policies. Rising international competition from cheaper imported seafood
has led to lower output prices. All of these conditions created a growing
need for an alternative approach to the traditional command-and-control
regulations.
In 2001 the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries initiated a policy
to encourage South Korean fishermen to form voluntary self-governance
groups and manage fisheries through self-regulated regimes (jayul gwanry
fishery). Under the new policy, fishermen could voluntarily form self-
governance committees, propose a set of self-regulations to the government
and, if the regulations were approved, implement the rules. In response,
the government gives greater responsibility and authority to the groups
to manage fishing grounds, stocks and harvests. In the case of maul fish-
eries, excludability of the fish resource (i.e., limited access) is provided
to members of groups primarily through TURFs (Uchida et al., 2008).
In addition to administrative and technical support to implement the
self-governance plans, the government provides financial rewards to self-
governance groups that have a good performance record to induce more
fishermen to form groups. In 2007 the government provided W 11.8 bil-
lion to 90 communities (20 per cent of the total number of self-governance
groups).
As a result of these efforts, the number of self-governance groups and
their members grew rapidly (table 1). There were 63 groups in 2001. By
2007, the number had grown to 579 groups made up of more than 44,000
fishermen. Of the 579 groups, more than 50 per cent were engaged in maul
fisheries. This high proportion is not surprising given that TURFs have
emerged most commonly around the world for sedentary marine resources
in inshore areas where TURF boundaries are relatively easy to define. Maul
fisheries are followed by coastal fisheries (18 per cent), combined fisheries
(maul and coastal fisheries) (16 per cent) and aquaculture (12 per cent).
The number of participating fishermen has steadily increased from 5,407
in 2001 to 10,765 in 2003 and 44,061 in 2007. Currently, the average number
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Table 1. Growth in self-governance groups in South Korea, 2001–2007
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Inshore TURF
(maul)
32 35 61 92 159 233 294
Aquaculture 11 12 15 22 46 70 72
Coastal fishery 8 19 29 34 52 71 102
Combined fishery 12 13 17 26 43 62 94
Inland fishery – – – – 8 9 17
Total no. self-
governance
groups
63 79 122 174 308 455 579
Total no.
fishermen with
membership
5,107 6,575 10,765 15,469 24,805 33,921 44,061
Average no.
members
per group
81 83 88 89 81 76 76
Notes: The numbers are cumulative.
Source: Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, 2008.
of member fishermen in each community is 70–80. The government aims
to establish 1,000 self-governance groups by 2011.
Despite expansion in the number of self-governance groups, there is lit-
tle evidence of the economic performance of this new approach to fishery
management. Lee, Gates and Lee (2006) provided examples of several suc-
cessful case studies and a website on self-regulated fisheries by the Korean
Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries also had a list of case
studies.4 To date, however, there has not been a systematic and quantita-
tive study measuring the effect of self-governance on economic outcomes.
The present study attempts to fill this gap.
4. Data
We use a data set from surveys that we designed and implemented in 2008.
The surveys were conducted via telephone with leaders of communities
engaged in inshore TURFs. In total, we interviewed leaders of 157 groups,
77 of which manage a fishery as a TURF with self-governance (hereafter
called self-governance groups) and 80 that have TURFs and engage in the
same or similar fisheries but do not have self-governance rules as a group
(hereafter called non-self-governance groups). The self-governance group
sample of 77 comes from a total of 294 groups that existed at the end
of 2007.
In conducting the sampling, we first eliminated self-governance groups
that were established in 2006 or later because it would be too soon to eval-
uate their effect. The groups were sampled in proportion to the number
4 See http://www.jayul.go.kr/ [in Korean].
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of self-governance groups in the 13 metropolitan cities and provinces in
South Korea. Non-self-governance groups were sampled from a list of all
communities with inshore TURFs that was provided by the Ministry of
Marine Affairs and Fisheries. To sample the non-self-governance group, for
each of the 77 self-governance groups we selected a non-self-governance
group in the same area that primarily targeted the same or similar species
so that the two groups were most comparable to each other.5 This data
set is believed to be the only one in existence that includes self-governing
and non-self-governing communities engaging in inshore TURFs in South
Korea.
The survey included data on fishery activities, socioeconomic charac-
teristics of the fishermen, perceptions of the status of their fisheries and
changes in those perceptions over time, and economic and production
trends. The survey instruments were pretested and revised prior to full
implementation. The surveys were conducted by telephone by experienced
and trained enumerators.
5. Survey results
5.1. Self-imposed rules
Our survey revealed a stark contrast between self-governance and non-
self-governance groups in how their maul fisheries are managed (table 2).
We asked the group leaders whether or not they have adopted any of
22 types of rules, which can be grouped into four categories: effort coor-
dination, operational restrictions, revenue sharing and quality control
measures.
By comparing adoption rates for the two groups, several features stand
out. First, a larger proportion of self-governance groups adopt all 22 types
of rules. The biggest differences in adoption rates appear in agreements
on operational restrictions, especially limits on operation hours (64 vs.
25 per cent) and days (54 vs. 24 per cent), total catch limits (32 per cent
vs. none) and protected areas (64 vs. 19 per cent). All of these differ-
ences exceed 30 per cent. Moreover, differences arise in the adoption of
quality control of catch (67 vs. 19 per cent). Rules that have a 20–29 per
cent percentage point difference include restocking, establishing artificial
reefs, assigning/rotating fishing grounds, seasonal closures, supply con-
trols, mesh size restrictions, limits on the number of pieces of fishing gear
and development of new products.
Interestingly, several rules are adopted equally by both groups. For
example, more than 95 per cent of both groups coordinate efforts in
cleaning the fishing ground. More than 80 per cent of both groups also
5 To be more precise, non-self-governance groups were selected from the same 13
metropolitan cities and provinces, and often from the close neighborhood, of self-
governance groups, but not from the same fishing community (ochongye). This
was done for a practical reason: in many fishing communities the majority of
community members joined the self-governance group if one existed, making it
difficult to obtain a sufficient sample size of non-members of the self-governance
group fishing from the same fishing community.
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Table 2. Number and proportion of groups adopting specific rules:
self-governance groups vs. non-self-governance groups, 2007
Number of Number of % of
self- % of self- non-self- non-self-
governance governance governance governance
groups groups groups groups
Agreements on effort coordination
Cleaning of fishing
grounds
70 97 74 96
Restocking 66 92 53 69
Monitoring of illegal
fishing
62 86 62 81
Removing harmful species 61 85 57 74
Establishing artificial reefs 54 75 30 39
Assigning/rotating fishing
grounds
35 49 12 16
Information exchange 1 1 0 0
Agreements on operational restrictions
Size/age limit 67 93 65 84
Seasonal closure 67 93 60 78
Operating hour limit 46 64 19 25
Protected areas 46 64 15 19
Operating day limit 39 54 18 24
Supply control 37 51 18 24
Mesh size 28 39 9 12
Number of fishing gear
pieces
25 35 10 13
Total catch limit 23 32 0 0
Number of fishing vessels 10 14 1 1
Gross tonnage 5 7 1 1
Revenue sharing
Revenue sharing among
group members
56 79 60 79
Quality control
Joint marketing 64 90 60 78
Quality control of catch 48 67 15 19
Development of new
products
19 27 3 4
Total number of groups 72 77
Notes: 72 of the 77 self-governance groups and 77 of the 80 non-self-
governance groups gave a valid response to this question.
Source: Authors’ survey.
monitor illegal fishing and nearly 80 per cent do some sort of revenue-
sharing among group members.6
6 This revenue-sharing is different from so-called pooling arrangements in fisheries
as described in the literature (c.f. Platteau and Seki, 2001; Uchida and Baba, 2008).
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of fishermen’s performance, fishing activities and
socioeconomic characteristics: self-governance vs. non-self-governance fishermen,
2007
Self- Non-self-
governance governance
groups groups
Group size 87.40 70.13
(82.37) (64.50)
Average tonnage (tons) 2.35∗∗ 1.73
(1.95) (1.84)
Average number of vessels operating 10.64 10.82
on a typical day (14.24) (19.92)
Average age of the group members 57.98 58.65
(5.85) (6.10)
Percentage of income from maul 41.85∗∗∗ 30.94
fishery (%) (24.93) (20.08)
Number of years since establishment 6.81 N.A.
of the self-governance group (5.49)
Number of non-self-governance 63.87 N.A.
group fishermen in the same (56.05)
community (ochongye) engaged in
the same fisheries
% of groups in which the members 79.22% N.A.
have the autonomy to choose (0.41)
whether to join the group
% of groups that requires a 29.87% N.A.
membership fee (0.46)
Notes: ∗∗∗The difference in means is significant at the 1% level; ∗∗the difference
in means is significant at the 5% level. All other mean comparisons are statis-
tically insignificant. The sample size is 77 for the self-governance groups and
80 for the non-self-governance groups. The number of valid responses differs
depending on the variable.
Source: Authors’ survey.
5.2. Characteristics of the groups
The group leader survey revealed that the two groups share some com-
mon characteristics in terms of group structure and fishing characteristics
(table 3). The average group size is around 87 fishermen for self-
governance groups and 70 for non-self-governance groups, which is similar
to the national average. Eleven vessels go out on an average fishing day.
This number is substantially lower than the group size because much of
Here, it refers to a system in which a portion of a fisherman’s revenue is taxed
and collected and funds are used for goods and services that benefit the group as
a whole.
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Self-governance group fishermen (n = 76) 
Non-self-governance fishermen (n = 78) 
Shellfish
77%
Shellfish
73%
Other
20%
Other
24%
Finfish
3%
Finfish
3%
A
B
Figure 1. Proportion of the primary target species type; self-governance groups vs.
non-self-governance groups, 2007.
Notes: Although the full sample size of the self-governance group is 77 and of
the non-self-governance group is 80, valid responses to this question totaled
76 and 78, respectively.
Source: Authors’ data.
the maul fisheries in the TURF are done by hand collection or diving. The
vessel size is relatively small for both groups with an average of two tons.
The type of targeted species also is similar. Among the co-management and
non-co-management groups, the proportion of surveyed groups targeting
shellfish is 77 and 73 per cent, respectively, and the proportion targeting
finfish is 3 per cent for both (figures 1A and B).
As to characteristics pertaining only to self-governance groups, the aver-
age number of years since establishment of the group is seven, suggesting
that many of these groups were established shortly after the government
enacted its policies in 2001 which introduced monetary incentives for
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Table 4. Summary statistics for why the self-governance groups were established
Reasons Mean (S.D.)
Because the government provided financial incentives 0.34
(1.33)
Because the extension staff recommended to us to 0.64
register as a self-governance group (1.24)
Because a neighboring fishery group (ochongye) −0.80
established a self-governance group (1.09)
Because other fishery groups (ochongye) in the same −0.92
fishery established a self-governance group (1.16)
Note: These questions were asked only of leaders of the self-governance groups.
The sample size of the self-governance groups is 77. The leader was asked to
answer using a five-step Likert scale that was then converted to values between
–2 and 2 where –2 is ‘strongly disagree’ and 2 is ‘strongly agree’. Standard devi-
ation is shown in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ survey.
fishermen to form self-governance groups. Interestingly, on average, there
are more than 60 fishermen in any given community (ochongye) engaged
in the same fisheries. For most self-governance groups, membership is not
mandatory (79 per cent) and only 30 per cent of the groups require some
sort of a membership fee.
5.3. Reasons why the self-governance group was established
The self-governance groups’ leaders revealed several reasons why the fish-
ermen established self-governance groups (table 4). Most influential was
that extension staff recommended groups to fishermen (row 2). The second
most important reason was the government’s financial incentive (row 1).
Not as many groups adopted self-governance because other communities
had established groups earlier; we therefore do not detect any peer effects
from our sample.
5.4. Perceptions of fishery management
Through our survey, we find that the leaders of self-governance groups
view the status of the fishery as bleaker than non-self-governance group
leaders. However, the situation is improving more for self-governance
groups (tables 5 and 6). In the survey, we asked group leaders to describe
the status of their fisheries in 2002 and how the conditions had changed
since 2002, one year prior to implementation of self-governance groups. We
asked them to evaluate statements regarding their fisheries on a five-point
scale where −2 indicates strong disagreement and 2 indicates strong
agreement.
We find that more leaders in self-governance groups perceived that the
status of their fisheries was bleaker in 2002 (i.e., prior to the establish-
ment of self-governance groups, table 5). For example, more leaders of the
self-governance groups thought that illegal fishing was prevalent (row 6).
They also thought that resource stock before the group establishment was
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Table 5. Perceptions of group leaders about the status of their fisheries in 2002
χ2 Statistics for
testing the difference
Self- Non-self-
governance governance Pearson’s Yates’
Variables groups groups χ2 correction
Resource stock was low due
to overharvesting in 2002
0.21
(0.17)
−0.54‡
(0.12)
30.96∗∗∗ 26.30∗∗∗
Fishing ground was congested
and there was over-
competition in 2002
0.01
(0.19)
−0.69‡
(0.12)
23.89∗∗∗ 19.96∗∗∗
Fishermen overinvested in
vessels and gears in 2002
−0.52‡
(0.17)
−1.00‡
(0.08)
24.11∗∗∗ 19.46∗∗∗
Price was low due to
oversupply in 2002
−0.12
(0.18)
−0.85‡
(0.09)
30.08∗∗∗ 25.59∗∗∗
Price was low due to size and
other fish attributes in 2002
−0.60‡
(0.15)
−0.75‡
(0.10)
19.32∗∗∗ 15.23∗∗∗
There was a lot of illegal
fishing in 2002
0.57‡
(0.19)
0.30†
(0.16)
17.91∗∗∗ 14.57∗∗∗
Notes: Standard error in parentheses.
All perception questions were asked in five categories and coded as follows:
−2 = strongly disagree to 2 = strongly agree. †, ‡ in columns 1 and 2 indicate
that the mean is statistically different from 0 (neutral) at the 5% and 1% signifi-
cance levels, respectively.
Because the survey responses are based on the Likert scale, the differences
between the responses from self-governance and non-self-governance groups
were tested using the Pearson’s χ2 statistics with degrees of freedom = 4
(Plackett, 1983, columns 3 and 4). Yates’ correction for continuity was also per-
formed since several cells contained less than five counts (Yates, 1934).
Significance levels are indicated as ∗∗∗, 1% and ∗∗, 5%. The sample size of the
self-governance group is 77 and of the non-self-governance group is 80. The
number of valid responses differs depending on the variable.
Source: Authors’ survey.
low due to overharvesting, and that fishing grounds were congested and
there was over-competition. Interestingly, leaders of non-self-governance
groups, on average, perceived that none of these issues were a serious
problem in 2002. Importantly, the differences in the means between the
non-self-governance groups are significant. A Pearson’s χ2 test, both with
and without Yates’ correction for continuity, was performed to test whether
the responses from the two groups differed significantly.7 The results show
7 Pearson’s χ2 test statistic is χ2 =∑i
(Oi − Ei )2
Ei
, where i is the cell index, O is the
observed count data, and E is the expected count (Plackett, 1983). Yates’ correc-
tion for continuity is to account for the fact that some of the cells had fewer than
five counts. The corrected test statistic is χ2 =∑i
(|Oi − Ei | − 0.5)2
Ei
(Yates, 1934).
Environment and Development Economics 55
the means for all six statements; the two groups’ responses were different
at the 1 per cent significance level.
We also asked group leaders about what changes they perceived in the
fisheries’ conditions since establishment of self-governance groups or, in
the case of non-self-governance groups, over the five years (2002–2007). We
chose this time period to be comparable with the self-governance groups
since the majority of them were established around 2002. The results show
that leaders of self-governance groups, on average, believe that the fish-
eries are improving for five of the eight aspects we inquired about in the
survey (table 6).8 For example, more self-governance group leaders indi-
cated that the resource stock is recovering and the overall fishing effort
is declining, both of which could decrease their costs. Disputes among
fishermen and illegal fishing are also declining more in the view of self-
governance groups. Of the 73 self-governance groups in our sample, 11
agreed or strongly agreed (i.e., answered ‘1’ or ‘2’ in Likert scale) with
improvements in all eight aspects; only 3 group leaders answered the
scale ‘2’ in all aspects. The vast majority of our sample indicated that
some measures have improved while the other did not. These findings
are consistent with the case studies showcased by the Korean government
on self-governance, many of which indicated that the profit has increased,
stocks have increased and price has increased (MOMAF, 2008). However,
the differences in responses between the two groups are statistically signif-
icant for all eight statements at a 1 per cent level based on the Pearson’s
χ2 test with and without Yates’ correction for continuity. In the subsequent
analysis, we will attempt to identify the effect of self-governance on these
eight factors as the outcomes of interest.
5.5. Logit model
To further understand the factors associated with the decision to estab-
lish a self-governance group, we estimate and compare results from two
logit models. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether the
respondent is in a self-governance group or not.9 The specification of the
model is derived from the literature, which discusses several key deter-
minants of group formation for self-governance of natural resources (c.f.,
Agrawal, 2001; Ostrom et al., 2002; Wilson et al., 2003; Townsend et al., 2008).
Degrees of freedom (DF) are equal to (number of rows – 1) multiplied by (num-
ber of columns – 1). In our context, the number of rows is two (self-governance,
non-self-governance) and the number of columns is five (five-point Likert scale)
so DF = 4.
8 We acknowledge a limitation and implications of having a different time span
in the dependent variable for self-managed and non-self-managed groups. The
estimates of this model would be biased if events affected the profitability of
the fisheries between the year that the treated groups were constituted and 2002.
To the best of our knowledge, the Korean fisheries did not experience any other
large policy changes during this period and there are no known natural disasters
affecting the fishery sector at that time.
9 These logit models are for descriptive purposes rather than to identify causal
effects.
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Table 6. Perceptions of group leaders about changes to their fisheries since
establishment of the self-governance group or during the past five years for the
non-self-governance group
χ2statistics for
testing the difference
Self- Non-self-
governance governance Pearson’s Yates’
Variables groups groups χ2 correction
Revenue is increasing 0.12
(0.17)
−1.09‡
(0.13)
29.02*** 25.03***
Cost is decreasing 0.52
(0.13)
−0.44†
(0.11)
31.22*** 26.67***
Resource stock is recovering 0.74‡
(0.15)
−1.01‡
(0.14)
49.56*** 44.67***
Overall fishing effort is
declining
0.87‡
(0.12)
−0.07
(0.13)
45.70*** 40.43***
Total harvest volume is
increasing
−0.45†
(0.15)
−1.03‡
(0.15)
42.89*** 37.37***
Price of this fishery is
increasing
0.11
(0.15)
−0.84‡
(0.10)
26.74*** 22.40***
Disputes among fishermen
are decreasing
0.73‡
(0.14)
0.16
(0.11)
28.33*** 23.59***
Illegal fishing is declining 1.17‡
(0.16)
0.67‡
(0.15)
16.95*** 14.50***
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. All perception questions were asked in
five categories and coded as follows: –2 = strongly disagree to 2 = strongly
agree. †, ‡ in columns 1 and 2 indicate that the mean is statistically different
from 0 (neutral) at the 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Because the survey responses are based on the Likert scale, the differences
between the responses from self-governance and non-self-governance groups
were tested using the Pearson’s χ2 statistics with degrees of freedom = 4 (Plack-
ett, 1983, columns 3 and 4). Yates’ correction for continuity was also performed
since several cells contained less than 5 counts (Yates, 1934).
Significance levels are indicated as ***, 1% and **, 5%. The sample size of the
self-governance group is 77 and of the non-self-governance group is 80. The
number of valid responses differs depending on the variable.
Source: Authors’ survey.
These include group size (the smaller the group size, the more likely), pro-
duction capacity (the smaller the scale, the more likely), fish type (the more
sedentary the target species, the more likely) and dependency on the rev-
enue source (the higher the income share, the more likely). We include
these factors plus demographic characteristics (average age of the group
members) in the model. There are, of course, unobservable factors that also
affect the decision to form a group, including some that we control for
in our model. For example, there could be regional differences in imple-
mentation of the national policy to promote self-regulation of fisheries in
Korea or differences in overall stocks. We have included regional dummy
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variables as a covariate to absorb these factors. However, there are other
unobservable factors at the sub-regional level that may play an important
role in fishermen’s decisions, such as the degree of trust among community
members. We acknowledge this limitation. In our specification, we include
variables related to socioeconomic characteristics of the fishermen, fishery
characteristics and regional fixed effects.
Overall, there are two key findings (table 7). On one hand, many of
the coefficients are insignificant, suggesting that the two groups are some-
what similar, which supports comparability of these groups. On the other
hand, there are several significant variables associated with establishment
of self-governance groups, which suggests that the two groups differ in
some aspects. Those differences must be controlled for when examining
the effects of self-governance on outcomes. In our subsequent analyses to
identify the effect of self-governance groups on outcomes, we control for
all of these variables.
6. Economic outcomes of self-governance
6.1. Empirical strategy
In an ideal world, we could identify the impact of self-governance groups
on economic outcomes using the following model:
yi = β0 + β1SGi + εi (1)
where yi is an outcome for group i ; SGi is a dummy variable with a value
of 1 if the group is self-governing and 0 otherwise; and the coefficient of
our interest is β1. We investigate eight indicators of outcomes as reported
in table 6.
Ideally, we would want to identify the effect of each rule or combination
of rules discussed in the previous section. However, all of the groups except
one non-self-governance group have adopted one or more rules. Moreover,
the 147 groups with valid data adopted 136 unique combinations of rules.
Consequently, in this study we could not identify the impact of a specific
rule or a combination of rules on economic outcomes.
Given this limitation, we examine the effect of self-governance groups
as a whole on economic outcomes. However, what we attempt to iden-
tify is more subtle than the effect of self-governance per se. By estimating
the coefficient β1, we capture two effects. The first is the effect of stronger
effort coordination, fishing restrictions and quality controls exemplified by
the higher rate of adoption of many of the rules by self-governance groups.
The second is the effect of formally registering as a self-governance group
through the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries. This process involves
considerably more than paperwork. As described in Lee et al. (2006) and
in Uchida et al. (2008), fishermen and the central government share the
authority and responsibility in planning, implementing and enforcing
the fisheries. Cooperatives, fishery associations and other fishery groups
develop their own regulations. The fishery committees formed by these
groups plan and implement the management scheme. In turn, the Ministry
of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MOMAF) provides administrative, legal
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Table 7. Factors associated with establishing a self-governance group based on the logit model
Dependent variable: 1 = self − governance
group; 0 = otherwise
Model 1 Model 2
Group size 0.001
(1.64)
0.000
(0.32)
Average tonnage 0.046∗∗
(1.92)
0.056∗
(1.80)
Average number of vessels operating
on a typical day
−0.004
(1.39)
−0.003
(0.83)
Average age of the group members −0.005
(0.68)
−0.003
(0.18)
Proportion of income from
maul fishery
0.006∗∗∗
(2.70)
0.008∗∗
(2.30)
Shellfish dummy 0.087
(0.30)
−0.045
(0.12)
Other species dummy 0.009
(0.03)
−0.033
(0.08)
Southeast region dummy −0.104
(0.97)
−0.390∗∗∗
(2.81)
North region dummy −0.00
(0.05)
−0.140
(0.90)
Resource stock was low due to
overharvesting in 2002
0.054
(0.96)
Fishing ground was congested and
there was over-competition in 2002
0.031
(0.54)
Fishermen overinvested in vessels
and gears in 2002
0.125
(1.62)
Price was too low due to oversupply
in 2002
0.281∗∗∗
(3.29)
Price was too low due to size and
other fish attributes in 2002
−0.235∗∗
(2.39)
There was a lot of illegal fishing
in 2002
0.046
(0.97)
Observations 150 123
Log likelihood −95.05 −62.69
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.26
Notes: Reported coefficients are marginal effects. The absolute value of z-statistics is
shown in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
In the perception questions added in Model 2, the leaders of comanagement groups
were asked about the period before establishing the group and the leaders of non-
comanagement groups were asked about 2002.
The omitted category for target species is finfish. The omitted category for region is
South/Central region. The sample size of the self-governance group is 77 and of the non-
self-governance group is 80. However, a non-response to one or more of the variables in
the regression model resulted in 150 observations in Model 1.
Environment and Development Economics 59
and technical support. Local governments, the regional MOMAF office
and the National Fisheries Research and Development Institute supervise
implementation of the project. We speculate that this formal process leads
to better enforcement and monitoring of the self-imposed rules relative to
unregistered groups.
The key problem in identifying β1 is self-selection bias. Since TURFs
were not randomized into a self-governance group, there could be system-
atic differences between TURFs that established self-governance and those
that did not, and those differences may be correlated with the outcomes.
Although the descriptive statistics shown in the previous section indicate
that the two groups are similar in many respects, the results from the logit
models show that a socioeconomic characteristic (proportion of income
from a maul fishery) and a fishery characteristic (average tonnage) are pos-
itively associated with the establishment of self-governance groups. These
factors also could affect the outcomes of interest to this study. For exam-
ple, groups with larger vessels may have greater revenue, which could
lead to a positive selection bias. Although the combined selection bias
effect of these variables is an empirical question, it is unlikely to be zero.
Hence, applying ordinary least squares to equation (1) is unlikely to give
an unbiased treatment effect.
To deal with self-selection bias, we utilize a covariate matching
method.10 This method is used to examine the impact of a treatment (in
our context, whether a self-governance group is formed or not) on an out-
come (e.g., trends in revenues and costs since 2002) when selection takes
place on observable characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984). Measur-
ing the effect of group membership on economic outcomes without bias
by using the matching method requires the so-called Conditional Indepen-
dence Assumption: that the outcome in the base state (outcome if the group
had not established a self-governance group) is independent of the treat-
ment (being a self-governance group), conditional on observed covariates.
If this assumption holds, we can say that, given the observable covariates,
the outcome of the non-self-governance groups is what the outcome of
the self-governance groups would have been if the group had not been
established as a self-governance group.
Matching works by finding a non-self-governance group that is very
similar to the self-governance one by conditioning on covariate vari-
ables non-parametrically (Black and Smith, 2004). Moreover, with match-
ing methods, we can impose ‘common support,’ which excludes self-
governance groups for which we cannot find a reliably similar non-self-
governance group.
10 The outcome variables in these models are ordinal and, therefore, it would be
more appropriate to adopt an ordered probit model than a regression-type model
as shown in equation (1). Although developing a matching estimator for an ordi-
nal outcome variable is beyond the scope of this paper, a study comparing a case
where the outcome is binary and comparisons with the matching estimator has
found that estimates from a matching estimator were the same as a version of a
discrete choice model (Aakvik et al., 2005).
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We follow the recent literature and use covariate matching and its vari-
ants. Covariate matching matches directly on covariates. In our analysis,
we choose to match the two nearest neighbors with the same (simi-
lar) covariates (Zi). Self-governance and non-self-governance groups are
matched on group size, average vessel tonnage, average number of vessels
operating on a typical day, average age of the group members, propor-
tion of income from the TURF fishery, the region in which the group is
located and the target species. In particular, we do exact matching on
region, gear type and target species since we believe that groups’ per-
formances could be quite different if these characteristics are not exactly
the same. Within these matched groups, we can then directly estimate
E(y1i|SGi = 1, Zi) and E(y0i|sGi = 1, Zi). Once we have a matched sample,
we compare the economic outcome of the self-governance group with that
of the non-self-governance group.
We report the estimated coefficients that use the post-matching bias
correction factor developed by Abadie and Imbens (2006). This factor is
needed to correct for conditional bias in finite samples when there are
three or more continuous variables. Based on recent work that demon-
strates that bootstrapping standard errors are invalid with non-smooth
nearest-neighbor estimators, we use Abadie and Imbens’s variance formula
for nearest-neighbor estimators as it is heteroskedasticity-consistent. With
covariate matching, we report the results using two weighting matrices.
One approach uses the inverse variance weighting scheme; the other uses
the Mahalanobis metric weighting scheme.
6.2. Estimation results
There are two key questions of interest. First, are the self-governance
groups better off than they would have been if they had not started self-
governance? In other words, given that a group, i , is a self-governance
group, is the group better off? This estimate can be expressed as E[y1i −
y0i|SGi = 1] and is the average treatment effect of the treated (ATT). Sec-
ond, we are interested in whether the formation of a self-governance
group will yield a greater benefit on average. That is, if current non-
self-governance groups were to start self-governance, how much of an
impact would be expected on average? This estimate is called the average
treatment effect (ATE) and is expressed as E[y1i − y0i].
In summary, the eight outcomes of interest as described in table 8
are based on questions about trends in revenues and costs, perceptions
of resource stocks, overall fishing efforts, total harvests, prices, disputes
among fishermen and illegal fishing and they compare the period prior
to establishment of self-governance groups (or the year 2002 for non-
self-governance groups) to conditions in 2007. Responses to questions
were in the form of a five-level Likert scale (2 = strongly agree,−2 =
strongly disagree, 0 = neutral). For each of the outcomes, we show the esti-
mates that use inverse distance and Mahalanobis metrics for matching. In
addition, we show both ATT and ATE for all outcomes with estimates from
32 matching models.
The covariate matching estimates for the effect of self-governance on
economic outcomes suggest that being part of a self-governance group
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Table 8. Estimated effect of self-governance on performance of the groups from
covariate matching models
Average treatment effect Average treatment
on the treated (ATT) effect (ATE)
Inverse Inverse
Outcome distance Mahalanobis distance Mahalanobis
Revenue is
increasing
0.90∗∗∗
(4.33)
0.92∗∗∗
(4.49)
0.96∗∗∗
(4.77)
0.96∗∗∗
(4.77)
Cost is decreasing 0.88∗∗∗
(5.13)
0.89∗∗∗
(5.18)
0.87∗∗∗
(5.14)
0.88∗∗∗
(5.11)
Resource stock is
recovering
1.53∗∗∗
(6.43)
1.50∗∗∗
(6.09)
1.61∗∗∗
(7.17)
1.56∗∗∗
(6.94)
Overall fishing effort
is declining
0.79∗∗∗
(3.69)
0.81∗∗∗
(3.76)
0.82∗∗∗
(4.31)
0.81∗∗∗
(4.20)
Total harvest volume
is increasing
1.21∗∗∗
(6.23)
1.22∗∗∗
(6.44)
1.20∗∗∗
(6.27)
1.19∗∗∗
(6.26)
Price is increasing 0.66∗∗∗
(3.25)
0.66∗∗∗
(3.22)
0.67∗∗∗
(3.53)
0.66∗∗∗
(4.77)
Disputes among
fishermen are
decreasing
0.44∗∗
(2.25)
0.47∗∗
(2.44)
0.42∗∗
(2.28)
0.46∗∗
(2.50)
Illegal fishing is
declining
0.71∗∗∗
(2.99)
0.72∗∗∗
(3.09)
0.40∗
(1.76)
0.41∗
(1.86)
Notes: N = 133. The absolute value of z-statistics is shown in parentheses.
∗∗∗significant at 1% level; ∗∗significant at 5% level; ∗significant at 10% level.
All estimates use bias-corrected matching estimator. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity-consistent.
Each treated sample is matched against four control samples using nearest-
neighbor matching based on the following covariates: group size, average
tonnage, average number of vessels operating on a typical day, average age of
the group members and proportion of income from a maul fishery. The treated
and control samples are exactly matched based on primary target species
and region. Twenty-four observations were dropped due to non-response to
either the dependent variable and/or one of the covariates.
improves both revenue and costs (table 8). All of the ATT estimates
are positive and statistically significant. Take, for example, the estimate
for the statement regarding changes in revenue. When we compare self-
governance and non-self-governance groups that are similar or exactly the
same in the covariates, the self-governance group is more likely to have
experienced an increase in revenue (row 1, columns 1 and 2). Moreover, the
ATT estimates for the statement about costs is also positive and statistically
significant, suggesting that establishing a self-governance group is likely
to lead to a decrease in costs (row 2, columns 1 and 2). These results are
generally consistent regardless of the metrics used for matching (inverse
distance vs. Mahalanobis).
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Among other outcomes, two coefficients have a large magnitude:
resource stock recovery and increasing harvest volume (rows 3 and 5,
columns 1 and 2). Large, positive and statistically robust coefficients sug-
gest that revenue may be increasing particularly because of recovering
stocks and increased harvest volumes.
The ATE estimates show that some of the benefits arising from forming
or becoming a member of a self-governance group may also extend to other
groups who are not currently organized as self-governance groups. The
ATE estimates for the eight outcomes are mostly positive and significant,
and the magnitudes are similar to those for ATT (columns 3 and 4). This
result suggests that, on average, the matched non-self-governance group
could benefit as much as the self-governance group if it were to start self-
governance. The only exception is the trend in illegal fishing. The ATT
estimates are around 0.72 whereas the ATE estimates are around 0.41. Both
are statistically significant, but the magnitude of the treatment effect is
reduced for the ATE compared to that of the ATT. One interpretation of
this result is that there is something that affects the establishment of self-
governing groups that also affects the reduction of illegal fishing. From
table 7, we see that the more income-dependent an average fisherman in
the group is to the maul fishery, the more likely it is that he will join the
self-governance group. Greater income-dependency also motivates a fish-
erman to protect the fishery and therefore to endeavor to reduce illegal
fishing.
7. Conclusion
Self-governance of natural resources through groups of resource users who
establish and impose management rules on themselves has been gaining
increasing attention in the policy arena as an alternative to command-and-
control and market-based mechanisms. Whether managing the resource
as a group results in economic gains for the group’s members is critical
incentive-compatibility criteria for such groups to be sustained in the long
run. This paper uses a unique set of data from South Korea to provide
some of the first quantitative evidence that self-governance is benefiting
those groups. Overall, we find that establishing a self-governance group
benefits its members in terms of both revenue and the cost of fishery activ-
ities. We find that the establishment of a self-governance group leads to a
better chance of stock recovery and larger harvests, as well as reductions
in fishing efforts, disputes and illegal fishing. These findings are encour-
aging indications that support the incentive-compatibility condition for
self-governance groups to function as clubs.
Our descriptive results show that one of the key motivations in estab-
lishing a self-governance group was the government’s financial incentive
program. Generally speaking, one would expect that such groups would
not be successful in generating benefits since they may have lacked a
strong motivation in better management of the fishery and that they would
likely return to previous fisheries management once the incentive pro-
gram ended. In this sense, it is thus surprising to find that fishermen
groups perceived such positive effects of self-governance groups across
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our sample. This result indicates that, while their motivation might not
have been better fishery management per se, members came to realize the
benefits of collective self-governance. This finding suggests an interesting
policy implication: what is important to successful self-governance is to
first get it started, even if it requires external incentives; once group mem-
bers realize the benefits of self-governance, it will be in their best interest to
continue and manage the fishery better. Transitioning from limited access
to a self-governance regime entails uncertainty (because it is new for them)
and transaction costs, and it is conceivable that extension staff’s recom-
mendations and government financial incentives were helpful in making
that transition. This result is consistent with the theory of clubs. Once a
club member finds herself in a privileged position as a club member and
perceives the benefits of the club, she has an interest in maintaining that
status.
The data and the results of the empirical analysis show that the self-
governance groups have been more successful than non-self-governance
groups in the recovery of resource stock (tables 6 and 8). The results also
imply that self-governance groups were at least not worse off relative to
the non-self-governance groups in terms of changes in revenue and prices.
More precisely, if the self-governance groups had not implemented the
activities as groups, they could have been worse off. These outcomes can
partly be attributed to self-governance groups’ investment in joint market-
ing and quality control (table 2). This is a trend that also has been observed
in Japanese coastal self-governance groups (Uchida, 2009) and was found
more generally in rights-based fishery management schemes (Homans and
Wilen, 2005). However, it is important that the self-governance groups
experience actual increases in revenue rather than merely being better off
relative to the non-self-management groups, because an increase in rev-
enue (as opposed to a resource stock recovery) is a clear and tangible
benefit for fishermen that often plays an important role in sustaining the
collective fishery management scheme.
One important caveat is that these outcomes are based on percep-
tion questions, not actual levels of change in revenue, costs, prices, pro-
duction and resource stocks. Therefore, while the covariate matching
results are encouraging, the significance of their magnitudes remains an
open question. Future research may successfully collect the type of data
needed to answer those questions through cooperation with fishermen
groups.
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